Journal article
A. D. Bassford
Review of Metaphysics, vol. 75(4), 2022, pp. 779-807
Review of Metaphysics, vol. 75(4), 2022, pp. 779-807
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APA
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Bassford, A. D. (2022). Ought Implies Can or Could Have. Review of Metaphysics, 75(4), 779–807.
Chicago/Turabian
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Bassford, A. D. “Ought Implies Can or Could Have.” Review of Metaphysics 75, no. 4 (2022): 779–807.
MLA
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Bassford, A. D. “Ought Implies Can or Could Have.” Review of Metaphysics, vol. 75, no. 4, 2022, pp. 779–807.
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@article{a2022a,
title = {Ought Implies Can or Could Have},
year = {2022},
issue = {4},
journal = {Review of Metaphysics},
pages = {779-807},
volume = {75},
author = {Bassford, A. D.}
}
Abstract: The moral principle that Ought Implies Can (“OIC”) is often assumed without argument in normative discourse. Is this assumption defensible? Some would argue that it is not, as there are many purported counterexamples against it in the literature. However, OIC is not so much a single principle as rather a family of them. In this paper, I will argue that, while not every OIC-type principle is defensible, at least one of them may be. I defend the cognate moral principle that Ought Implies Can or Could Have (“OICCH”). I first show that it is able to circumvent the traditional counterexamples to OIC. And then I show that OICCH is even more plausible than some of the best alternative OIC-type principles to date. The upshot of this paper is that those who find OIC compelling should consider accepting OICCH instead.
Key Words: ought implies can; moral normativity; deontological metaethics; deontic logic
