I am working on three essays at the moment. The prospective abstracts are as follows.
Theology for Equivocators
The subject of this essay is contradictory theism, the thesis according to which (A) God exists; and (B) We ought to recognize that some statements about him are either neither true nor false or both true and false. Classical logic, however, recognizes the law of semantic bivalence, according to which, necessarily, every statement is either true or false, and never both. Consequently, contradictory theists recommend that, at least when engaged in theological discourse, philosophical theists implement some or another semantically deviant, paraconsistent logic—one that either violates the LEM or the LNC. Importantly, contradictory theists also recommend we reject the principle of explosion (ECQ): Even if a statement about God should violate either the LEM or the LNC, this does not mean that all hell would break loose. At least some theological contradictions, they say, are nonexplosive and do not trivially entail everything. This essay considers the case for contradictory theism, specifically for subthesis (B). Subthesis (A) is taken for granted. The first part of the essay discusses varieties of contradictory theologies, as well as their accompanying contradictory logical semantics. The second part then presents the arguments supporting some or another contradictory theology. A total of five argumentative strategies are explored. Some of the arguments presented are stronger than others. Nonetheless, collectively, they seem to make a strong cumulative case for recognizing that some statements about God are semantically deviant.
The subject of this essay is contradictory theism, the thesis according to which (A) God exists; and (B) We ought to recognize that some statements about him are either neither true nor false or both true and false. Classical logic, however, recognizes the law of semantic bivalence, according to which, necessarily, every statement is either true or false, and never both. Consequently, contradictory theists recommend that, at least when engaged in theological discourse, philosophical theists implement some or another semantically deviant, paraconsistent logic—one that either violates the LEM or the LNC. Importantly, contradictory theists also recommend we reject the principle of explosion (ECQ): Even if a statement about God should violate either the LEM or the LNC, this does not mean that all hell would break loose. At least some theological contradictions, they say, are nonexplosive and do not trivially entail everything. This essay considers the case for contradictory theism, specifically for subthesis (B). Subthesis (A) is taken for granted. The first part of the essay discusses varieties of contradictory theologies, as well as their accompanying contradictory logical semantics. The second part then presents the arguments supporting some or another contradictory theology. A total of five argumentative strategies are explored. Some of the arguments presented are stronger than others. Nonetheless, collectively, they seem to make a strong cumulative case for recognizing that some statements about God are semantically deviant.
Zhu Xi's Neoconfucian Hylomorphism
This project attempts to classify Neoconfucian philosopher Zhu Xi’s (Chu Hsi) metaphysical system within a common taxonomy of western global metaphysics. The project is comprised of two parts, divided between two essays. In the first essay, I propose that Zhu’s system is a species of hylomorphism. Zhu’s theory is not as thoroughly developed as that of, say, Aristotle, but a hylomorphic interpretation of Zhu’s Classified Conversations nonetheless enjoys good textual evidence. Additionally, interesting questions are raised by considering on what points, and why, Zhu and Aristotle differ as they do. In the second essay, I then consider an application of both theories. I will compare Zhu’s metaphysic of death with that of Aristotle’s successor, St. Thomas Aquinas, and once again highlight the significant points on which the two hylomorphic analyses converge and diverge. Hylomorphism is generating renewed interest in contemporary metaphysics. The upshot of this project is that Zhu Xi should be included in the discussion too.
This project attempts to classify Neoconfucian philosopher Zhu Xi’s (Chu Hsi) metaphysical system within a common taxonomy of western global metaphysics. The project is comprised of two parts, divided between two essays. In the first essay, I propose that Zhu’s system is a species of hylomorphism. Zhu’s theory is not as thoroughly developed as that of, say, Aristotle, but a hylomorphic interpretation of Zhu’s Classified Conversations nonetheless enjoys good textual evidence. Additionally, interesting questions are raised by considering on what points, and why, Zhu and Aristotle differ as they do. In the second essay, I then consider an application of both theories. I will compare Zhu’s metaphysic of death with that of Aristotle’s successor, St. Thomas Aquinas, and once again highlight the significant points on which the two hylomorphic analyses converge and diverge. Hylomorphism is generating renewed interest in contemporary metaphysics. The upshot of this project is that Zhu Xi should be included in the discussion too.
